IWPR #E511
February
2002
By Janice Peterson, Ph.D.
About this Briefing Paper
This Briefing Paper was prepared by Janice Peterson while serving as a Study Director at the Institute for Women’s Policy Research and was released in February 2002. It is based on research funded by the Ford Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and The David and Lucile Packard Foundation. Helpful comments were provided by Barbara Gault, Heidi Hartmann, Vicky Lovell, Linda Silberg, and Melissa Sills.
Table
of Contents
A Feminist Agenda for
TANF Reauthorization Introduction
Today's used of
the term “welfare reform” typically refers to the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) -- the
federal cash public assistance program established in 1935 to serve poor
single mothers and their children -- with a state-level block grant, the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. But, “welfare reform” was an
important and often hotly debated issue long before the mid-1990s, and many of
the welfare reform themes raised in the 1990s were not new. Concern about the “moral fitness” of poor single mothers, for
example, has been an issue since the days of the state-level Mothers' Pensions
programs that preceded the establishment of AFDC, and conceptions of
"deservingness" have always been steeped in traditional gender
ideology and highly racialized (Gordon 1994; Abramovitz 1996; Peterson 1996;
Mink 1998). And, despite the
maternalist rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the AFDC program,
restrictive eligibility requirements and low benefits have meant that
historically many welfare recipients have participated in wage labor (Gordon
1994; Abramovitz 1996). Only 26
percent of single mothers who receive welfare rely solely on cash assistance
for their families’ survival (Spalter-Roth et al. 1995). The nature of the relationship between public assistance and the
low-wage labor market has long been a concern to critics of the welfare system
from a variety of perspectives (Mink 1994).
Beginning
in the 1970s, welfare reform discussions became increasingly focused on moving
welfare recipients into paid work (Albelda 1999), with the increasing labor
force participation of middle- and upper-income mothers with young children
often invoked as the rationale for this policy focus (Cohen and Bianchi 1999;
Hartmann 1994). This argument has
been fraught with contradiction, with many of the most passionate supporters
of the notion that “welfare mothers” should work outside the home also
being the most vocal proponents of policies that facilitate the ability of
middle- and upper-income mothers to choose to stay home with their young
children (Mink 1998). This
argument also ignores some important aspects of mothers' labor force
participation. For example, while
the labor force participation of married mothers has increased dramatically,
and married mothers often make critically important contributions to family
incomes, the vast majority of married mothers in the United States are not the
sole breadwinners for their families, which is essentially what is now being
asked of poor single mothers (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Hartmann 2001).
In many ways, the welfare reform debates of the mid-1990s embodied a number of
ideological issues and concerns that have been a part of welfare reform
discussions for a long time, and the "historic" legislation that
emerged from these debates reflects this. This legislation did, however, change the structure of income support
for poor families in the United States in a number of very significant ways,
including the institution of the “work-based safety net" for poor
families with children and the inclusion of "family formation"
issues – such as the reduction of non-marital births and the promotion of
marriage and two-parent families – among the welfare system's primary goals.1
The
TANF program must receive Congressional reauthorization by September 30, 2002,
and it is expected that Congress will consider changes to the TANF program
during the reauthorization debates. Welfare
researchers and advocates hope that this will provide an opportunity for
Congress to take stock of the extensive research on the impacts of TANF and to
make programmatic changes that address some of the problems this research
identifies. There are also
serious concerns, however, that changes may be made to the program that will
further weaken the safety net for poor families. Feminist researchers and advocates are particularly concerned that the
realities of poor women's lives not be ignored in TANF reauthorization
discussions. The
purpose of this paper is to identify some of the key issues and goals that are
emerging in TANF reauthorization discussions and to consider what a feminist
agenda for TANF reauthorization might look like. The paper begins with an overview of the key elements and impacts of
TANF, followed by a discussion of some critical TANF reauthorization issues
and advocacy goals, and closes with some thoughts on how these issues and goals relate to feminist
understandings of women's poverty and welfare reform. Key
Elements of TANF2
The
changes associated with the TANF program are extensive, including revisions in
federal law, state law, and state and local implementation practices. Typically, the focus of TANF reauthorization discussions is on federal
law and the policy decisions made by states within this framework. The provisions in federal law often identified as the key elements of TANF include the elimination of the entitlement to cash
assistance, block grant funding to the states, mandatory work requirements,
sanctions, and a five year time limit on cash assistance (Haskins, Sawhill, and
Weaver 2001a: 8). In addition,
TANF includes a number of specific “family formation” provisions.
Elimination
of Cash Welfare Entitlement Block
Grant Funding
Work
Requirements In
the federal law, education and training activities count toward the work
participation requirements to a very limited extent (Greenberg and Laracy
2000: 9; Greenberg et al. 2000: 7). In
addition, most states have adopted a "work first" approach, built on
the belief that "any job is a good job. "In these programs, the goal is the rapid placement of recipients into
jobs for which they are currently qualified (Pavetti 2000: 46). Sanctions Five Year Time Limit Family Formation
In
many ways, the most radical change associated with the 1996 legislation is the
elimination of the individual entitlement to cash public assistance. Under the AFDC program, states were required to aid all
families eligible under state income standards; this is no longer the case. It is now left up to the states to determine when and under what
conditions they will provide cash public assistance to poor families. While the federal law prohibits states from using TANF funds to assist
certain categories of individuals or families, there is no requirement that a
state provide assistance to any individual or family (Committee on Ways and
Means 2000: 353; Greenberg et al. 2000: 6; Pavetti 2000: 44; Haskins et al.
2001a: 8).
Under
the AFDC program, the federal government paid at least half of all benefit
costs on an open-ended basis, with federal welfare spending increasing as AFDC
caseloads rose. The TANF program,
however, is funded as a block grant, providing a fixed sum ($16.5 billion per
year) through fiscal year 2002 (Haskins et al
The
1996 law requires that a specified and rising percentage of the total TANF
caseload be engaged in specific work activities that are listed in the law
(Committee on Ways and Means 2000: 353; Haskins et al. 2001a: 8). States must require all recipients to participate in these
work activities after they have received no more than two years of assistance,
although states may choose to exempt those with a child under 12 months (Pavetti
2000: 44-46). In most states,
recipients must work long before the end of the two year period; in 1999, for
example, 28 states had policies that imposed immediate work requirements
(Council of Economic Advisers 2001: 194).
Under
the TANF program, states must reduce the cash TANF benefit of adults who fail
to meet the work requirement designed by the state. Thirty-seven states have chosen to implement "full family
sanctions," meaning they can end the entire cash TANF benefit (to the
children as well as to the adults) of families in which the parents or
guardians fail to meet work requirements (Pavetti 2000: 46; Haskins et al.
2001b: 4). Nineteen states have
chosen to eliminate Food Stamp benefits if the family head is noncompliant,
and 12 states eliminate the Medicaid benefits of sanctioned adults (Pavetti
2000: 44-46). In addition,
the federal government will reduce the block grant of states that fail to have
the specified percentage of their caseload engaged in work activities (Pavetti
2000: 44; Haskins et al. 2001a: 8).
States
may not use federal TANF funds to provide assistance to a family that includes
an adult who has received federally funded TANF assistance for a total of five
years over their lifetime. States
may allow exceptions for up to 20 percent of families currently receiving
assistance. They have the option
of adopting a shorter time limit, or using their own funds to continue cash
assistance beyond the five year limit (Committee on Ways and Means 2000;
Greenberg et al. 2000; Haskins et al. 2001a: 9). A total of 36 states impose 60-month time limits; of the
remaining states,
The
stated purposes of TANF refer to the "family formation" goals of
promoting marriage and two-parent families and reducing non-marital
childbirths
Proposals
to prohibit states from providing assistance to the children born to unmarried
teen mothers and proposals to prohibit states from offering assistance to
additional children born to families receiving welfare (the so-called
"family cap") were dropped from the federal legislation, but under
the federal law states have the option of adopting such policies (Committee on
Ways and Means 2000: 1408; Greenberg et al. 2000:13-14). As of 2000, 19 states had taken the federal option and instituted
family caps (Welfare Information Network, http://www.welfareinfo.org/OtherStateProvisions-FamilyCap-etc.htm).
Impacts
of TANF
The
literature examining the impacts of TANF is quite extensive and covers a wide
range of outcomes, including those involving welfare caseloads, employment,
earnings, income, poverty, and family formation. The research findings that have received the most attention
from those who argue welfare reform is a success report on welfare caseloads
and employment; the findings on earnings, income, and poverty are much more
mixed. Family formation outcomes,
while very important in recent welfare reform rhetoric, have received far less
attention in the evaluation literature.
Welfare
Caseloads and Employment Another
widely cited impact of welfare reform is the increase in the employment rates
of various groups of single mothers. National
labor force data indicate that, after a decade of little change, the number of
single mothers participating in paid work rose by 25 percent between 1993 and
1999, including a 50 percent increase in the number of never-married mothers
who were employed (Haskins et al. 2001a: 4). By 1999, 71 percent of single mothers were employed, an employment rate
exceeding that for married mothers (Committee on Ways and Means 2000: 1408). The employment rates for women who received welfare benefits at some
point in the year increased from 39 percent in 1994 to 57 percent in 1999,
after remaining relatively flat through the late 1980s and early 1990s
(Bernstein and Greenberg 2001: 12). In
addition, both state and national studies consistently show that roughly 60
percent of those who have left the TANF program are employed shortly after
leaving the program (Primus and
Daugirdas 1999: 5; Greenberg 2000a: 1; Bernstein and Greenberg 2001: 13;
Haskins et al. 2001a: 4).
How
much of the decline in caseloads and the increase in employment is due to
welfare reform, and how much is due to the strong economy or other policy
changes, like increase
The
most widely cited impact of welfare reform is the decline in the number of
families receiving cash public assistance. The national welfare caseload reached its peak in 1994, with 5.0
million families receiving cash public assistance. By the time of TANF's passage
in August of 1996, caseloads had declined to 4.4 million families; after the
passage of TANF the rate of decline in the caseload escalated, falling to 2.5
million families by June 1999 – a 50 percent decline since the peak in 1994
(Committee on Ways and Means 2000: 352; Greenberg and Laracy 2000: 10).
The
growth in the total incomes of these families has also been disappointing,
particularly in light of the significant increases in employment. Even though the rise in employment (even at low wages) has increased
the aggregate earnings of poor single mothers as a group, for many families
average income has increased very little, if at all, because the increase in
earnings has been offset by the loss of welfare benefits. Among the poorest quintile of single mother families, average incomes
have actually fallen despite increased earnings (Primus and Daugirdas 1999: 6;
Committee on Ways and Means 2000: 1413; Pavetti
2000: 48; Haskins et al. 2001a: 5).
Despite
early predictions that welfare reform would increase poverty, official poverty
statistics show that as the caseload has declined each year, so have both the
overall poverty rate and the rate of child poverty (Haskins et al. 2001a: 4). Caseload declines (in both the TANF and Food Stamp programs) have
greatly exceeded declines in poverty, however, thus substantially reducing the
share of poor families who
receive public assistance (Primus and Daugirdas 1999: 5-6; Committee on Ways
and Means 2000: 1412; Greenberg 2000a: 1). In addition, "deep poverty" (defined as family income below
50 percent of the poverty level) has increased among some single mother
families, indicating that some of the poorest single mothers and children have
become poorer (Porter and Dupree 2001: 17; Pavetti 2000: 48-49; Haskins et al. 2001a: 4).
Family
Formation The
research findings on the structure and impacts of TANF raise a number of
issues for consideration and debate in the context of TANF reauthorization.
Perhaps the most fundamental issue to be addressed is the primary
purpose of TANF (and of welfare reform overall).
A number of other issues are also likely to be raised, including the
funding of TANF, the structure and implementation of time limits, the
structure and implementation of sanctions, the impacts on child well-being,
the adequacy and affordability of child care, the effectiveness of current
"welfare-to-work" strategies, the impact of an economic recession,
and racial/ethnic disparities in the implementation and impacts of TANF.3
Primary
Purpose of TANF : Reducing
Poverty vs. Increasing Marriage Progressive
researchers Jared Bernstein and Mark Greenberg (of the Economic Policy
Institute and the Center for Law and Social Policy), for example, argue that
welfare reform has not focused enough on what should be the goal of true
reform, "the improvement of the economic well-being of poor families with
children" (Bernstein and Greenberg 2001: 11).
They emphasize that although caseloads have fallen and employment has
increased, "welfare reform has not fundamentally improved the living
standards of many of the families it has affected" (Bernstein and
Greenberg 2001: 11). This
position grounds a policy agenda for TANF reauthorization that defines changing the law's central focus from caseload reduction to poverty
reduction as the top priority. This
is supported by calls for increasing (or at least maintaining) the size of the
block grant, making states more accountable for the way they spend their block
grant funds (for example, by expanding states' reporting and tracking
requirements so that the impacts of welfare reform can be adequately
assessed), and for reforms in key elements of TANF, such as work requirements,
time limits, and sanctions (Edelman 2000; Harrington and Rozell 2000;
Bernstein and Greenberg 2001; Gordon 2001). Conservative
researchers Charles Murray and Robert Rector (of the American Enterprise
Institute and the Heritage Foundation), on the other hand, argue that the
family formation purposes of TANF are its most fundamental goals and must be
at the forefront of reauthorization reforms (Murray 2001; Rector 2001b).
The inclusion of these provisions in the 1996 legislation was inspired,
to a great extent, by the work of Murray, who asserts that "illegitimacy
is the single worst social problem of our time – more important than crime,
drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare, or homelessness because it drives
everything else" (quoted in Greenberg et al. 2000: 13).
This position grounds a policy agenda for TANF reauthorization that
seeks to further limit the access of poor single mothers to public assistance
and to aggressively promote marriage to those who receive it (Murray 2001;
Rector 2001b). Feminist
scholars and activists argue that it is simply incorrect to posit marriage as
the solution to women's poverty, and inappropriate for the government to
impose a particular definition of family – the traditional patriarchal
family – through law and social policy.
Marriage is viewed as a "constitutionally protected choice
and not a decision poor women should have to make in exchange for income
support. Feminists also stress
the importance of recognizing the role of domestic violence in perpetuating
women's poverty, and argue that policies promoting two-parent families must
fully and explicitly address this concern so that they do not promote the
establishment of high-conflict households (Payne and Davis 2001). Progressives
from a variety of perspectives emphasize the fact that while polls show
"most Americans continue to prize and value marriage as an important life
goal," there is "a great deal of uncertainly about the appropriate
role of the government with respect to marriage" (Greenberg et al. 2000:
16). It is argued that social
welfare policy should provide the appropriate supports to all families –
including those with two parents, a population that was largely excluded from
the earlier AFDC program. It is
also argued by some progressives that encouraging the involvement of parents
in the lives of their children should be the goal (instead of promoting
certain family structures), in which case social welfare policy should pay
more attention to the needs of "fragile families" (those headed by
unmarried couples) and to the fathers (who are often the non-custodial
parents) of children receiving welfare (Primus and Daugirdas 1999; Edelman
2000). Funding
of TANF Structure and
Implementation of Time Limits Structure and
Implementation of Sanctions Adequacy
and Affordability of Child Care
To
date, much less attention has been paid to the impacts of the family formation
initiatives than to the welfare-to-work provisions of TANF, and the
evaluations that have taken place show little impact. For example, the majority of evaluations of welfare-to-work programs
that examined marriage and birth rates for single parents report no impacts,
and studies of state AFDC waiver initiatives that included "family
cap" policies have found inconclusive results (Committee on Ways and Means 2000: 1444-1445).
The
funding level of the TANF block grant will be an issue of debate in
reauthorization discussions (Haskins et al. 2001b: 2).
Funding levels for TANF were based on the size of the caseload in 1994,
and, given the dramatic decline in the caseload since that time, it is argued
by some that federal TANF funding is now too high and should be cut back
(Rector 2001b: 8). Others,
however, argue that the remaining caseload has many unmet needs and that
welfare-to-work strategies may become increasingly expensive and require more
funds to adequately serve this population. In addition, it is argued that as welfare reform enters the
next phase, more attention should be given to assisting low-income working
families more generally. Thus, an
important goal for many advocates is increasing (or at least maintaining)
federal levels of TANF spending and state maintenance-of-effort dollars
(Greenberg and Laracy 2000: 14; Greenberg et al. 2000:10; Van Lare and Griener
2000: 4-5). Moreover, as the U.S.
economy heads into a recession, welfare case loads are likely to rise again
and states will need more money not less, just as their state dollars are
falling. Some advocates would
prefer to have the federal entitlement status of AFDC returned.
Time
limits – seen by many as the "hallmark of welfare reform" –
remain one of its most controversial features. While
supporters of time limits argue that they play "an enormous symbolic
role" (Rector 2001a: 267), many welfare researchers and advocates argue
that in the context of mandatory and strictly enforced work requirements there
is no rationale for placing arbitrary time limits on welfare receipt. In addition, it is argued that the impact of time limits is
still unknown, since in the majority of states they have not yet been reached.
There is particular concern that those families who remain on welfare,
and who are likely to be affected by time limits, have significant barriers to
employment and will face serious hardships when assistance ends, especially in
the context of a recession (Haskins et al. 2001b: 4).
Many advocates argue that, at the very least, the federal time limit
structure should be revised to provide more flexibility in assisting working
families – by, for example, "stopping the clock" when a parent is
employed, caring for young children, or going to school – and increasing
exemptions for those who cannot find and maintain employment due to barriers
such as caring for a chronically ill or disabled child or having experienced
domestic violence (Edelman 2000; Greenberg 2000b; Greenberg et al. 2000: 11;
Harrington and Rozell 2000: 10; Van Lare and Griener 2000: 5; Haskins et al.
20001b: 4).
Supporters
of strict sanctions argue that they "send an important message that the
state is serious about changing behavior" (Rector 2001a: 266) and are
necessary for the implementation of mandatory work requirements.
Research on sanctions shows they are, in fact, widely and routinely
used: in some states, as many as a third of the cases are under sanction or
have received a sanction (Haskins et al. 2001b: 4).
Critics of current sanction policies report research findings that show
many of the families who have lost assistance through sanctions are among
those with the least education and most severe barriers to employment, and
often do not understand why they are being sanctioned (Bernstein and Greenberg
2001: 13; Pavetti and Bloom 2001: 258-260; Haskins et al. 2001b: 4).
Welfare advocates call for increased state and local accountability in
terms of sanctioning policies, the institution of federal protections against
arbitrary sanctions, and increased outreach and services to promote compliance
and resolve obstacles prior to sanctioning (Edelman 2000; Greenberg 2000b;
Greenberg et al. 2000: 11-12; Harrington and Rozell 2000).
The
family support policy that has probably received the most attention in welfare
reform discussions is child care. The 1996 law made a number of changes in the
system of child care for low-income families, including the consolidation of
child care funding streams, modestly increased funding (around $4.5 billion
over 6 years), and increased state flexibility (Greenberg et al. 2000: 25;
Haskins et al. 2001a: 10). Although
supporters of welfare reform emphasize the increase in child care funding that
has accompanied this legislation, the Department of Health and Human Services
has estimated that existing child care block grant funding provides enough
money to serve only 12 percent of all eligible low-income children.
Child care services necessary to support a work-based safety net are
clearly not accessible to all who need them.
Many researchers and advocates call for an increase in federal child
care funding and increased enforcement of standards in child care quality
(Haskins and Blank 2001; Haskins et al. 2001b: 5). The Institute for Women’s Policy Research found that
working AFDC participants spent 34 percent of their earnings on child care,
and work-reliant single mothers spent 19 percent of their earnings on child
care (Burns et al. 1997). Under
AFDC recipients who left welfare for work received a guaranteed entitlement of
one year of subsidized child care. That
entitlement was eliminated under TANF (Greenberg et al. 2000).
Impact of an Economic
Recession
Welfare
reform has been characterized as a "fair weather ship" – the
strong economy of the late 1990s played an important role in the positive
outcomes associated with welfare reform (such as falling caseloads and
increased employment). It is not
known what the impact of welfare reform will be in an economic downturn
(Bernstein 2001: 3; Blank 2000: 19). Little
has been done to make either the funding or the structure of the TANF program
responsive to an economic downturn – for example, the "contingency
fund" set up to aid states facing high unemployment rates is widely
regarded as inadequate, and time limits and work requirements do not take
recessionary conditions into account (Bernstein 2001: 3).
In addition, many former TANF recipients who lose their jobs are not
eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI), a problem not limited to an economic
downturn, but one made worse by such conditions (Blank 2000: 19; Peterson
2000; Haskins et al. 2001b: 7). In
effect, the welfare system serves as time-limited unemployment insurance for
poor single mothers who are at a high-risk for job loss and would otherwise be
without a safety net (Lovell and Hartmann 2001).
Research on the AFDC caseload showed that only 11 percent of working
AFDC recipients who became unemployed received UI benefits (Spalter-Roth,
Hartmann, and Burr 1994). These issues are getting increasing attention, with calls to build a
counter-cyclical component into the funding of TANF and to adjust the
structure of time limits to take recessionary conditions into account
(Bernstein 2001), as well as to reform the UI system to extend coverage to
more former welfare recipients and other low-wage workers (Lovell and Um'rani
2000; Peterson 2000).
Racial/Ethnic
Disparities
Another
critically important issue is the differential impact of TANF on members of
racial/ethnic minority groups. While
the racial/ethnic impacts of welfare reform have received less attention from
the research community than other impacts, existing evidence indicates
"somewhat differential impacts for minorities and whites, and in some
studies, discriminatory treatment of minority groups” (Savner 2000: 3).
Research on the dynamics of welfare receipt, for example, finds that
black and Hispanic recipients tend to have longer stays on welfare and are
therefore more likely to be affected by time limits (Savner 2000: 3).
Studies also suggest that white recipients may be more likely to find
employment and/or "receive favorable treatment by welfare agency
workers" (Carroll 2001: 3; Gordon 2001).
Recent studies of welfare leavers find that whites are more likely to
leave welfare because of employment, while blacks are more likely to have been
sanctioned off (Cazenave and Neubeck 2001: 1-2; Savner 2000: 4).
Researchers
and advocates call for states to explicitly monitor the outcomes of
welfare leavers by race and ethnicity (Carroll 2001: 3) and to increase
the accountability of states for the impacts of welfare reform on all of their
citizens (Gordon 2001). In
addition, it is argued that welfare research and advocacy must pay more
attention to the role of discriminatory practices in both the welfare system
and the labor market in limiting the opportunities of members of racial/ethnic
minority groups (Savner 2000). Further,
shifting the focus of welfare reform from caseload reduction to poverty
reduction is viewed as an essential and fundamental component of any strategy
to eliminate racial/ethnic disparities in the structure and outcomes of
welfare policy (Gordon 2001). Interestingly,
the existence of widespread gender discrimination in the labor market is
rarely addressed in the debate about welfare reform.
A
Feminist Agenda for TANF Reauthorization The issues
emerging in the context of TANF reauthorization indicate that this discussion
provides opportunities to move beyond the negative rhetoric of past welfare
reform debates to the development of policies that improve the economic
security of poor mothers and their children.
It is difficult to identify "a woman's agenda" or "a
feminist agenda" for TANF reauthorization, since poor women are diverse
and experience welfare reform in different ways, and feminist researchers and
activists are diverse and bring different perspectives to the discussion.
It is, however, possible to identify basic insights in feminist
analyses of women's poverty and welfare reform that can provide a framework
for pursuing the issues and goals emerging in the TANF reauthorization
discussion in ways that explicitly seek to promote the economic security of
poor women.
From this perspective, it is the adequacy of the income packages available to poor single mothers that is of primary importance, and increasing the material standard of living for poor single mothers and their families becomes the primary goal of welfare reform. This view is consistent with the calls of other researchers and advocates for the placement of poverty reduction as the primary goal of welfare reform, but in some ways takes this goal a step further. Feminists argue that the official poverty measure is an inadequate measure of economic well-being for families incurring large work-related expenses and call for the use of alternative measures (such as the "self-sufficiency standard") to monitor and evaluate the outcomes of welfare reform (Boushey, Brocht, Gundersen, and Bernstein 2001; Pearce and Brooks 2001; Bernstein, Brocht, and Spade-Aguilar 2000; Renwick and Bergmann 1993).4
Addressing the work-family conflicts of welfare recipients and former welfare recipients means that welfare policy must recognize the extreme difficulties many poor women face in trying to balance the demands of being a breadwinner with those of caring for their families -- their own poor health and disabilities, ill and/or disabled children, domestic violence, inadequate child care, and jobs that offer little in the way of family benefits or flexibility. The public provision of necessary family supports (such as subsidized child care and paid family leave) must become a top priority of welfare reform, and improvements in the quality of low-wage jobs (including the provision of paid sick and vacation leave) must accompany welfare-to-work strategies. In addition, the key elements of TANF (such as work requirements, time limits, and sanctions) must be revised to reflect caregiving realities.
Feminists also emphasize the role of occupational segregation in keeping women's wages low and see "work first" strategies pushing women into largely female-dominated, low-wage work that offers little opportunity for earning a living wage. These concerns are consistent with those raised by many researchers and advocates about the effectiveness of "work first" strategies and support calls for altering work participation requirements and increasing access to education and training. However, a feminist perspective also emphasizes that the types of education and training opportunities available to poor women must also be addressed, and more access to both post-secondary education and training for non-traditional employment must be part of any strategy to promote women's economic independence through market work (Negrey et al. 2001; NOW Legal Defense and Education 2001).
In addition, the five year time limit of the receipt of federal assistance assumes that poor mothers can become self-sufficient in a five year time period. As economist Rebecca Blank has argued, this assumption is not supported by the labor market realities – such as the instability of work and low wages – faced by poor women (Haskins and Blank 2001). Currently, many TANF recipients do work but do not earn enough to move themselves and their families off public assistance. At the very least, the time limit clock should be stopped for TANF recipients who are working or engaged in approved education and training activities a substantial number of hours per week.
Conclusions
In
conclusion, a feminist agenda for TANF reauthorization views welfare receipt
as a legitimate survival strategy for poor women and recognizes the very
large challenges often faced by poor mothers trying to balance paid work and
caregiving. It acknowledges the
nature of the labor markets poor women enter and the need to reduce
gender-based employment discrimination, improve the quality of the jobs
available, and enhance the skills and abilities of poor women.
It places poverty reduction, broadly defined, as the primary purpose of
welfare reform and supports keeping adequate funds available in TANF block
grants to achieve this goal. It
calls for the restructuring of time limits and sanctions to take into account
the barriers to employment faced by many poor women and the fact that even
those who become employed face hurdles to achieving true economic security.
Some feminists argue for the reinstatement of the entitlement and the
elimination of work requirements for mothers with pre-school age children.
A feminist agenda for TANF reauthorization supports efforts to strengthen the safety net for children, particularly through strengthening the safety net for all low-income families. It recognizes the lack of quality child care and other family supports as important barriers to poor women striving to succeed in the labor market while raising children, and supports efforts to make the provision of such family supports a top priority. It shares the concerns of many about the effectiveness of "work first" strategies, emphasizing the gendered nature of women's employment opportunities and the many barriers to employment at adequate wages that welfare recipients face. Feminists strongly support efforts to increase the education and training opportunities available to poor women and efforts to increase opportunities for women to work in non-traditional fields.
A feminist agenda for TANF reauthorization recognizes that former welfare recipients are likely to be the first to lose their jobs in a recession and supports calls to make TANF more responsive to the business cycle and to reform Unemployment Insurance to be more inclusive of low-wage workers and workers with family commitments. It is committed to addressing racial/ethnic disparities in TANF and the labor market, and supports calls to make the welfare system more accountable to all of its participants. A feminist vision for TANF reauthorization is grounded in the belief that ultimately welfare reform must be part of a larger agenda to promote economic justice and economic security for all members of society.
Prior to the implementation of TANF, "no federal program expressly sought to influence marital status" (Greenberg et al. 2000: 13).
2 The 1996 law includes a number of additional provisions not discussed here, including those to restrict benefits to non-citizens and to increase emphasis on child support enforcement (see Greenberg et al. 2000).
3 For a discussion of other TANF reauthorization issues, such as those concerning benefits to non-citizens and the distribution of child support, see Primus 2001; Greenberg et al. 2000.
4 The "self-sufficiency standard" measures what a family needs in a particular state to maintain an adequate standard of living, taking into account the costs of working outside the home.
5 A number of TANF recipients in New York City's Work Experience Program,
for example, have come forward with serious sexual harassment claims.
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